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ABSTRACT: In this paper, an agent-based framework to quantify the seismic resilience of an Electric Power 
Supply System (EPSS) and the community it serves is presented. Within the framework, the loss and restoration 
of the EPSS power generation and delivery capacity and of the power demand from the served community are 
used to assess the electric power deficit during the damage absorption and recovery processes. Damage to the 
components of the EPSS and of the community built environment is evaluated using the seismic fragility functions. 
The restoration of the community electric power demand is evaluated using the seismic recovery functions. 
However, the post-earthquake EPSS recovery process is modeled using an agent-based model with two agents, the 
EPSS Operator and the Community Administrator. The resilience of the EPSS-Community system is quantified 
using direct, EPSS-related, and societal, community-related, indicators. Parametric studies are carried out to 
quantify the influence of different seismic hazard scenarios, agent characteristics, and power dispatch strategies 
on the EPSS-Community seismic resilience. The use of the agent-based modeling framework enabled a rational 
formulation of the post-earthquake recovery phase and highlighted the interaction between the EPSS and the 
community in the recovery process not quantified in resilience models developed to date. Furthermore, it shows 
that the resilience of different community sectors can be enhanced by different power dispatch strategies. The 
proposed agent-based EPSS-Community system resilience quantification framework can be used to develop better 
community and infrastructure system risk governance policies. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
The Electric Power Supply System (EPSS) is the backbone of modern communities. Its resilience is crucial for the 
recovery of the communities affected by natural disasters (Mieler, Stojadinovic, Budnitz, Comerio, and Mahin, 
2014). Resilience refers to the capability of a system to decrease the initial damage it may suffer due to disruptive 
events, together with the ability to bounce back to the appropriate and stabilized functionality level thereafter 
(Society of Risk Analysis, 2015). Nevertheless, as exemplified by many occurrences in recent history, EPSSs did 
not prove sufficiently robust to and recoverable from the impact of natural hazards and random technological 
failures, resulting in serious economic and societal losses (Andersson et al., 2005, Liu et al., 2012, Fujisaki et al., 
2014, Kwasinski et al., 2014). In addition, seemingly inconsequential local damage can propagate through EPSSs 
due to inherent interconnectivity and lead to wide-scale cascading failures, which can further affect other 
interdependent critical infrastructures (Dueñas-Osorio and Vemuru, 2009, Buldyrev et al., 2010, Zio and 
Sansavini, 2011). In many cases, the losses after a natural disaster tend to be more severe than expected due to 
inadequate preparedness and dependence on other infrastructure systems that also impacted by the disaster (Adachi 
and Ellingwood, 2008, Hollnagel and Fujita, 2013, Yu et al., 2015). 
Against this backdrop, the focus of both researchers and practitioners expanded from disaster risk to post-
disaster resilience of civil infrastructure systems. It is expected that resilient systems will be robust to catastrophic 
disruptive events while also able to recover quickly from the initial damage they sustained (Lundberg and 
Johansson, 2015), thus reducing the risks such systems pose. 
The notion of disaster resilience as a time-varying process (Michel-Kerjan, 2015) has recently been 
extensively examined. There are many proposals to quantify the seismic resilience of civil infrastructure systems 
and communities (Hosseini et al., 2016). Bruneau et al. (2003) proposed a conceptual framework to consider the 
seismic resilience of infrastructure systems from four aspects, which are technical, organizational, social and 
economic. Ouyang et al. (2012) put forward a quantitative model for assessing the total functionality loss of the 
affected infrastructure systems during the shock absorption and the recovery phases.  
Resilience quantification frameworks developed to date address the ability of the civil infrastructure systems 
to operate and provide service, i.e. to supply the community. The demand of the community for the functions 
provided by the supporting civil infrastructure systems is assumed to remain unchanged, which is usually not true 
after natural disasters, particularly earthquakes. The gross functionality loss and, therefore, the disaster risk are 
difficult to evaluate as the system functionality level after the disaster recovery process will not necessarily be the 
same as the pre-disaster level (Linkov et al., 2014). 
To address these challenges, a compositional resilience quantification framework was developed by Déle and 
Didier (2014), and applied to quantify the seismic resilience of EPSSs by Sun et al. (2015a) and Didier et al. 
(2015). In this framework, both the power supply capacity of EPSS and the power demand from the community 
that it serves are considered simultaneously and tracked as they evolve through the earthquake damage absorption 
and post-earthquake recovery phases. The gap between the supply and the demand is used to quantify the lack of 
resilience of the EPSS-Community system. Two measures for such lack of resilience, one that quantifies the 
electric power deficit/functionality loss, and is directly related to the function of the EPSS, and the other that 
quantifies the number of people without electric power and is related to the function of the community, are 
proposed.  
The initial performance level losses of each individual component of EPSS (e.g. transformers, switches, and 
circuit breakers) and the built environment it supplies (e.g. office and apartment buildings, factories, schools, 
hospitals) in the earthquake damage absorption phase are assessed using seismic Vulnerability Functions (VFs). 
Seismic VFs describe the probability that the loss of functionality of a component will exceed a given threshold, 
conditioned on a measure of intensity of the ground motion excitation that the component experienced. Loss of 
functionality assessment starts by determining the damage state of the components of the community built 
environment and the civil infrastructure systems. Libraries of seismic damage fragility functions are available for 
the components of the community built environment (Rossetto and Elnashai, 2003, Kwon and Elnashai, 2006, 
Jeong and Elnashai, 2007, Senel and Kayhan, 2009, ATC-58, 2015, OpenQuake, 2015, Syner-G, 2015) and civil 
infrastructure systems (HAZUS, 2015, Syner-G, 2015), including the EPSS components. Once the damage states 
of each component are determined, their level of functionality is quantified using deterministic relations between 
damage states and portions of remaining functionality (be they on the supply or on the demand side) proposed by 
Déle and Didier (2014) to obtain the VFs for the components. System-level vulnerability is computed by 
aggregating the remaining functionality of the components immediately after the earthquake event. This concerns 
both the demand and the supply of the electric power and involves a model of EPSS system operation, the so-
called EPSS dispatch.  
The community and the EPSS will enter the post-earthquake recovery phase after the damage has been 
absorbed. Recovery Functions (RFs) are developed to represent the recovery process (HAZUS, 2015) of the 
components of the EPSS-Community system. RFs quantify the probability that the component functionality 
exceeds a threshold after an amount of time from the start of the recovery process (usually measured in days), 
conditioned on the amount of the initial loss of functionality. System functionality is evaluated by considering the 
supply, demand and the electric power dispatch in the EPSS-Community system. Thus, by modeling the supply, 
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demand and deliverable power, the electric power deficit can be tracked through the recovery phase, and the 
associated measures of EPSS-Community system resilience can be computed (Sun et al., 2015a, Didier et al., 
2015).  
Development of RFs is challenging. As opposed to VFs, there are significantly fewer RFs available in the 
literature (HAZUS, 2015). Furthermore, given the scarcity of post-earthquake recovery data, it is difficult to 
validate and calibrate the proposed RFs. Furthermore, generalizing RFs across EPSSs may not be possible because 
the component behavior is contingent on the unique characteristics of the EPSS they belong to. In addition, there 
is a remarkable influence of the state of the interdependent infrastructure systems, e.g. the transportation system, 
on the EPSS component and system repair activities during the post-earthquake recovery period. Most 
significantly, the interplay and coordination among different involving parties will govern the restoration of the 
damaged EPSS, and in turn, be reshaped by it.   
In this paper, a novel approach to develop model-based RFs is proposed with the goal to dissect the 
complexities associated with the seismic recovery process of EPSS-Community system. This approach is based 
on the Agent-Based Model (ABM) paradigm, which has grown as a modeling strategy for capturing the dynamic 
behavior of a broad range of social, economic and ecological systems (O'Sullivan and Haklay, 2000). Specific 
agents representing the actors in the EPSS repair process, namely, the Operator of the EPSS and the Administrator 
of the community, are instantiated and the rules that govern the interaction among these agents are defined. The 
proposed framework is exemplified in a case study, where parameter variations are carried out to examine the 
influence of different agent behavior characteristics and the earthquake intensity on the EPSS supply recovery rate.  
Using the ABM RFs and the compositional resilience quantification framework, the following questions can 
be answered: 
1. How does the EPSS-Community system seismic recovery process evolve over time, and which 
parameters and decision influence it most? 
2. How does the interaction among different agents involved in the recovery process of the EPSS-
Community system shape that process? 
3. What can be done to increase the resilience of an EPSS-Community system and thereby reduce the risks 
it is exposed to? 
In this paper, Section 2 elaborates the principles of the proposed seismic resilience framework and the 
corresponding implementation. In Section 3, the framework is applied to an example EPSS-Community system. 
The topology, the parameter distributions, the electric power dispatch model as well as the systemic resilience 
measures are presented. Section 4 discusses the resulting seismic resilience of example EPSS-Community system 
under different earthquake scenarios and the interaction patterns between the agents. Section 5 summarizes the 
main findings and indicates possible future research topics.  
2. FRAMEWORK FOR QUANTIFYING SEISMIC RESILIENCE OF EPSS-COMMUNITY 
For an EPSS in normal operations, the electric power supply capacity is designed to cover the community demand. 
A strategy for distributing the generated electric power to the consumers with the goal of minimizing the costs, 
maximizing the profits, and minimizing the risks to the network infrastructure while minimizing the risks of 
disrupting the balance of supply and demand (i.e. brown- and black-outs) is called the electric power dispatch 
(Morsali et al., 2015). The balance between the supply and the demand can be disrupted due to damage from strong 
earthquakes. After such an event, the EPSS-Community system absorbs the seismic shock and enters a recovery 
phase until the system functionality stabilizes at a new level. The time scales of the absorption and the recovery 
phases are very different (hours vs. days), especially after catastrophic earthquakes (Ge et al., 2010, Iuchi et al., 
2013) when the recovery phase may take years. Therefore, the seismic resilience of the EPSS-Community system 
is modeled by examining the functionality loss in the absorption phase as well as by tracking the functionality 
restoration path during the recovery phase separately for the demand and the supply sides of the EPSS-Community 
system. 
The functionality of the EPSS-Community system is assessed by disaggregating this large-scale 
heterogeneous system into a set of supply and demand nodes while preserving their connectivity. The earthquake 
ground motion intensity measures (IMs) at the nodes differ and depend on their geographic location with respect 
to the earthquake epicenter. The geographic distribution of IMs at the EPSS-Community system node sites, the 
earthquake scenario, is determined using ground motion prediction equations for a given earthquake magnitude 
and location of its epicenter. 
2.1. EPSS-Community system functionality assessment in the absorption phase 
Given an earthquake scenario, seismic fragility functions are used to evaluate the Damage State (DS) of each 
component conditioned on the earthquake ground motion intensity the component experienced. Specific fragility 
functions are adopted for each component of EPSS (e.g. transformers, switches, and circuit breakers) and 
communities (e.g. office and apartment buildings, factories, schools, hospitals) to represent their unique physical 
and societal behavior (Déle and Didier, 2014). For simplicity, three damage states are considered, i.e. no damage 
(DS1), moderate damage (DS2) and extensive damage (DS3). Vulnerability of each component is then assessed 
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by computing its remaining degree of functionality. In particular, no loss of functionality is assumed if a component 
is in damage state DS1, complete loss of functionality is assumed if the component is in DS3, and an intermediate 
interpolated degree of function loss is assumed for components in DS2. One such loss of functionality damage-
state-based assignment is adopted in Sun et al. (2015a).  
Decreased functionality of each node, on the supply or on the demand side, is determined individually, as 
specified above. Decreased functionality the EPSS-Community system at the end of the seismic damage absorption 
phase is computed by aggregating the functionality of the nodes using a model of EPSS operation, the seismic 
contingency electric power dispatch.  
2.2. Recovery of the Community power demand 
Once the earthquake damage is absorbed, the Community and the EPSS enter a relatively long recovery period. 
The post-earthquake recovery path of the electric power demand generated by the Community is affected by many 
factors, e.g. the efficiency of the reconstruction of buildings and industrial facilities, the restoration of public 
services, as well as by the societal norms and conventions. RFs are used to model the post-earthquake recovery of 
the community demand for electric power. RFs are the “mirror images” of the VFs in that they quantify the 
probability that a community component functionality, and thus its demand for electric power, will be restored 
after a certain recovery time, conditioned on the component damage state. As shown in Fig. 1, RPDS2(t) and 
RPDS3(t) RFs are sigmoidal functions of time in the recovery phase, formulated as lognormal probability 
distribution functions to satisfy the bounds and the monotonicity requirements. Following (Yang et al., 2012), a 
random number r ϵ [0, 1] is generated at any point in time t during the recovery simulation process. If a component 
is in DS2, it is considered as fully recovered at time t if r < RPDS2 (t). If a component is in DS3, it can recovery 
partially (to DS2) or fully (to DS1). Thus, the state of a component in DS3 is determined as follows: it recovers 
fully if r < RPDS3 (t), it recovers partially, to DS2, if RPDS3 (t) < r < RPDS2 (t), and it does not recovery if r > RPDS2 
(t).  
 
  
Fig. 1. Recovery functions for the EPSS-Community system components. 
 
To facilitate quantification of the seismic resilience of EPSS-Community system, the power deficit for 
different sectors of the community is tracked separately. The community built inventory associated with the 
population through permanent or high intermittent occupancy, namely the residential buildings, the schools and 
the critical facilities such as hospitals, are combined into the Population sector, while the portion of the built 
inventory associated with production, such as industrial facilities and office buildings, are grouped into the Factory 
sector. The total demand at a distribution node k is: 
 
D(t)k = Dp(t)k + Df(t)k                                                                                                                                                                                 (1) 
 
where Dp(t)k and Df(t)k are the instantaneous demands from the Population and Factory sectors connected to 
the EPSS at distribution node k, respectively, at time t in the recovery process. Instantaneous demand depends on 
the initial damage and the rate of the recovery process of each component of the community built inventory, as 
well as on the occupancy type and quantity associated with that component. The initial damage state is determined 
as stated in Section 2.1, and the recovery process is modeled as stated above, sequentially in time throughout the 
post-earthquake recovery process. The electric power demand is computed as directly proportional to the 
component loss of functionality as proposed in Sun et al. (2015b).  
The power delivered to the distribution node k is determined by the electric power dispatch strategy adopted 
by the EPSS operator. In normal operating conditions, the delivered power DP(t)k matches the demand D(t)k at 
each distribution node k. Further, when a distribution node supplies both the Population and the Factory sectors 
of the community, the supply is distributed to the two sectors in proportion to their demand. In emergency 
situations, such as after an earthquake, the power deliverable to a distribution node may be smaller than the demand 
at that node because of loss of power generation substations and transformers due to earthquake-induced damage 
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and possible inability to transmit the available power through the damaged EPSS network because of transmission 
line capacity limits. Consequentially, the power deficit at the distribution node k is: 
 
PD(t)k = D(t)k-DP(t)k ≥0                                                                        (2) 
 
If the distribution node k failed and is has not recovered at time t the power deficit is equal to the node 
demand, i.e. PD(t)k=D(t)k. The power deficit at node k is equal to zero when the delivered power equals the 
demand. For distribution nodes that supply both the Population and the Factory sectors of the community the 
power deficit is proportioned in the same proportion as the demand, namely: 
 
PDp(t)k = PD(t)k·(D_P(t)k/D(t)k)                                                                             (3) 
PDf(t)k = PD(t)k·(D_F(t)k/D(t)k)                                                                                                                          (4) 
 
At the level of the EPSS-Community system, the power deficit PD(t), PDp(t) and PDf(t) are computed by 
summing up the corresponding distribution node power deficits: 
 
PD(t) =  ∑ 𝑃𝐷(𝑡)𝑘𝑘                                                                                                                                        (5) 
PDp(t) =  ∑ 𝑃𝐷𝑝(𝑡)𝑘𝑘                                                                                                                                                       (6) 
PDf(t) =  ∑ 𝑃𝐷𝑓(𝑡)𝑘𝑘                                                                                                                                                        (7) 
 
Similarly, the system-level power demand D(t) and the deliverable power DP(t) are also obtained by 
aggregating the corresponding nodal values.  
2.3. Lack of Resilience Measures 
Resilience of the EPSS-Community system in the proposed framework is quantified by counting the number of 
people without power at time t during the post-disaster recovery process. This is an instantaneous resilience 
measure.  
At the distribution node k, the number of people without power PwoP(t)k is directly related to the power 
deficit of the Population sector of the community. However, the actual number of people without power after a 
strong earthquake is contingent on many different factors (e.g. casualties, rescue and evacuation of the population, 
post-earthquake aid and temporary housing, long-term post-disaster organization of the community) that are not 
contained explicitly in the proposed framework. To estimate number of people directly affected by a power deficit 
at distribution node k, the following is assumed: a) if the transformers in the distribution substation failed, the 
entire population Pk served by this node is considered affected; b) otherwise, the number of people without power 
is proportional to the ratio of the power deficit PD(t)k and the power demand D (t)k associated with the population. 
It is further assumed that 65% of the power demand is directly consumed by the residents (Eurostat, 2015) and the 
remaining 35% is consumed by other activities in the Population sector (e.g. transportation, food safety and 
preparation, heating or cooling, etc.). Therefore, for every operating distribution node k the percentage of 
population without power is: 
 
PwoP(t)k = (PDp (t)k/(0.65× Dp(t)k))*Pk ≤ Pk                                                                                                     (8) 
 
where Pk is the number of people served with distribution node k. This number corresponds to the number of 
the built inventory components served by the distribution node k and the occupancy of these buildings. It is 
assumed that Pk remains constant during the entire recovery process, i.e. changes in the population (injuries, deaths, 
outflows and inflows due to evacuations, etc.) are not modeled.  
At the EPSS-Community level, the number of people without power in the entire community is evaluated as 
PPwoP(t), the percentage of population without power, calculated by summing the distribution node PwoP(t)k 
values at time t after an earthquake and normalizing by the total community population served by the EPSS. 
Another instantaneous system-level resilience measure is the electric power deficit, as shown in Equations 5 
through 7. In addition, following the framework established by Ouyang et al. (2012), the gross functionality loss 
on the system level Floss(t) will also be employed as another direct, EPSS-related, measure of the lack of resilience: 
 
Floss(t) = 100*(1-G(t)/Go)                                                                  (9) 
 
Here, Go and G(t) refer to the level of functionality of the power generation capacity of the EPSS before and 
at a time t after the earthquake event, respectively.  
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2.4. Agent-based seismic recovery model of the EPSS supply 
The post-earthquake recovery process of the EPSS supply is stochastic and case-specific. The information about 
the EPSS system state and component condition is assumed to reach the EPSS operator in the immediate aftermath 
of the earthquake. The operator assess situation and, after a short period of time, the repair teams are dispatched 
to repair EPSS components and restore power supply following a certain prioritization strategy. The rate of EPSS 
component repair depends on the functionality of other civil infrastructure systems, namely the telecommunication 
and the transportation systems, which is, in turn, affected by the lack of electric power, thereby inducing additional 
dynamics in the already complex EPSS-Community system.  
For an EPSS in normal operations, the total electric power supply capacity is designed to cover the 
community demand, and the electric power dispatch is designed to minimize electricity costs and risk to the 
network infrastructure, as well as to maximize the EPSS profit. However, after strong earthquakes, it is likely that 
power generation and supply capacity cannot cover the demand from the served community. Therefore, the EPSS 
operator devises a Seismic Contingency Dispatch Strategy (SCDS) to distribute the available power resources to 
the consumers that can use electric power. Restrained by the inadequate power supply capacities, the operators 
first have to develop a “ranking list” (which can evolve over time) to decide which consumers should be prioritized, 
and which would be “sacrificed”. This prioritization strategy is case-specific and it is established by making trade-
off among societal, economic, political and sometimes even ethical considerations.  
The EPSS recovery priorities and the SCDS might not necessarily reflect the needs of the community it 
serves. Therefore, the EPSS recovery process may need to be steered externally, by local community leaders, to 
ensure that community priorities are addressed (Opricovic and Tzeng, 2002, Kapucu and Liou, 2014). The actual 
recovery path results from the interplay between the EPSS and the community recovery priorities. The RF-based 
approach used model the recovery of the community demand is neither broad nor adaptable enough to model the 
recovery of the EPSS supply and the EPSS-Community system interactions during the recovery process. Thus, the 
post-earthquake restoration path of EPSS supply and the EPSS-Community system is modeled using an Agent-
Based Model (ABM). 
For simplicity and with no loss of generality, two principal players, the EPSS operator (hereafter Operator) 
and the local community leadership (hereinafter Administrator) are considered in this framework. The two-player 
framework can be easily extended to a multi-player one if the actions of additional entities that affect the recovery 
process are to be accounted for in the recovery process. The two featured agents act as follows:  
Operator: The behavior of this agent is described by three attributes, namely Velocity, Efficiency and 
Tenacity, denoted as V, E and To, respectively. Specifically, V describes the average travelling speed of the repair 
team that is set to travel the shortest distance (a straight line) between two substations during the 
restoration campaign, E quantifies the repair rate as the percentage of component functionality restored per day, 
and To refers to the degree with which the Operator agent is capable of executing its own repair plan priorities. 
Administrator: The behavior of this agent is described by one attribute, the Tenacity (denoted as Ta) that 
quantifies the ability of the community leaders to enforce community repair priorities at one (or more) community 
resilience measure threshold values.  
Following an earthquake that disrupts the EPSS-Community system, the Operator agent starts the repair 
actions after an idle period needed for the emergency actions, EPSS state acquisition, and planning that includes 
the information about the state of other community infrastructure systems. The EPSS recovery plan reflects the 
balance of income and expenses deemed optimal from the business perspective of the EPSS owners. In this ABM, 
the tempo of the restoration is governed by the Operator agent’s V and E parameter values that can be considered 
as directly proportional to the cost of recovery.  
Simultaneously, the recovery of the community power demand proceeds (modeled as described in Section 
2.2). However, the recovery priorities of the community may be different than those of the EPSS. For example, 
the need for electric power in the most damaged regions may be essential for emergency rescue, medical care, 
water and food supply, and for sanitation, making a prolonged lack of electricity supply in certain areas 
undesirable. The community may have its own recovery performance objectives (SPUR, 2009, Smith, 2013) that 
quantify the state of the built environment and civil infrastructure systems, as well as high-level functions of the 
community (Mieler et al., 2014), during the recovery process and set a recovery timeline and milestones.  
A periodic check of the community recovery milestones is implemented in the proposed ABM through a 
comparison of one or more resilience measures to their threshold values at certain instances during the recovery 
process. If the rate of recovery is satisfactory, the EPSS operator is allowed to continue the recovery process 
following their own priorities. However, if the rate of recovery is too slow, the community may be able to enforce 
its recovery priorities by making the EPSS operator change its recovery plan. In the proposed ABM, this process 
is implemented through the interaction between the Administrator and the Operator agents. Namely, if the rate of 
community recovery is not fast enough (i.e. the resilience measure threshold values are not attained at the time 
they are checked), the Tenacity Ta parameter of the Administrator is increased to make it more likely that the 
Operator will be incentivized to address the community recovery priorities. If this is the case, not only is the 
Operator recovery plan changed to address the community priorities, but the V and E parameters of the Operator 
agent are also incremented to model the increase in EPSS operator resources invested in community recovery.  
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In the ABM framework proposed in this paper, the recovery of the EPSS-Community system is evaluated 
using the percentage of people without power PPwoP(t) resilience measure described in Section 2.3. The rate of 
recovery is evaluated only once, at t=72 hours (three days) after the earthquake disaster (SPUR, 2009, Smith, 
2013). This point in the recovery process is assumed to be critical for the success of the recovery process and is 
termed the Resilience Check Time (Cimellaro et al., 2016). However, other resilience measures can be checked at 
one or more other instances during the recovery process to make sure that the recovery process is meeting the 
community performance objectives. 
 
  
Fig. 2. Illustration of the interactions among Administrator and Operator agents in the proposed ABM. 
 
The value of PPwoP(72 hours) is compared to the community recovery measure threshold value to check the 
recovery progress. If the progress is satisfactory, the Operator agent continues with the recovery process following 
its original repair priority plan. Otherwise, the Tenacity parameter of the Administrator agent is incremented 
relative to the initial Tenacity of the Operator. The values of the Tenacity attributes of the two agents determine 
whose priorities are going to be addressed first during the recovery process, as shown in Fig. 2. Namely, if Ta < To 
there are no changes, but if Ta  To the priorities of the community take precedence. As a result, it is likely that the 
Operator will be incentivized to embrace the Administrator’s recovery priorities. For example, the Operator may 
need to repair the most seriously damaged substations first, and only thereafter proceed in the descending order of 
damage for the remaining damaged EPSS components. If the repair plan change is triggered, the speed V and the 
efficiency E attributes of the Operator are increased in order to increase the rate of the recovery process. The 
agents’ state update also reflects the ability of the Administrator to prioritize the EPSS Operator vehicles on the 
available roads while coordinating the restoration campaign. The EPSS restoration proceeds using the plan selected 
after the check of the recovery process progress until all damaged EPSS components are fully repaired. 
3. APPLICATION OF THE PROPOSED ABM FRAMEWORK 
The proposed ABM framework was implemented in Matlab and is demonstrated using a virtual EPSS-Community 
system. The EPSS is extracted from the IEEE 118-node Benchmark System (Christie, 1993). As illustrated in Fig. 
3, the EPSS consists of 15 generation substations (red squares) and 19 distribution substations (blue circles). 
Generation substations inject electric power into the network and transfer the electric power using the 
interconnecting power lines. Distribution substations supply the low-voltage power grids, i.e. extract electric 
power from the network and transfer it to the consumers in the community. The nominal electric power supply 
capacity of the 15 generation substations and the electric power demand of the 19 distribution substations are 
presented in Table I, respectively. Also listed is the assumed population served by each distribution substation. 
For simplicity, only the distribution and the generation substations are considered, while the other components of 
the EPSS as not modeled. The topology and the societal structure of modern communities are complex and 
heterogeneous. In order to reduce the complexity of this example, the community served by the virtual EPSS 
described above is disaggregated into two sectors, i.e. the Population sector comprising the residential buildings 
and the critical facility, and the Factory section, comprising the industrial facilities. 
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Fig. 3. Topology of the virtual EPSS-Community system.  
 
The built inventory in each of these sectors is further divided into sub-categories listed in Table II. The EPSS 
and the served community are made geographically denser by scaling the IEEE 118 EPSS down by a factor of 5, 
resulting in a roughly 32x52km area of the virtual EPSS-Community system (Fig. 3). The scaling ensures that 
significant ground shaking from earthquakes with magnitudes between 4 and 7 affects most of the EPSS and of 
community component locations in most simulations, thus generating non-trivial simulation outcomes.  
Table I. Characteristics of the generation and distribution substations of the virtual EPSS. 
Generation Distribution 
Generation  
Substation 
Power 
Generation 
(MW) 
Distribution 
Substation 
Power Demand 
(MW) 
Population  
Served Pk  
(103) 
 
Sector Served 
1 150 2 41.6162 76 Population+Factory 
4 50 3 61.7809 66 Population+Factory 
6 50 5 69.6968 96 Population+Factory 
8 100 7 16.1609 66 Population 
10 50 9 52.9856 32 Population+Factory 
12 100 11 34.3699 134 Population 
14 25 13 53.3392 224 Population 
17 50 15 60.0792 224 Population 
18 50 16 64.6848 256 Population 
23 25 19 4.1300 24 Population 
24 50 20 26.9800 24 Population+Factory 
25 50 21 6.1100 24 Population 
29 50 22 4.1300 24 Population 
30 50 26 29.2884 76 Population+Factory 
31 50 27 51.3934 72 Population+Factory 
  28 16.6912 64 Population 
  32 16.0809 66 Population 
  33 9.4406 44 Population 
  34 114.1500 0 Factory 
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Table II. Community built inventory types in the two power demand sectors. 
Sector Use Type of Structure 
Population 
Residential 
Reinforced concrete apartment building 
Masonry apartment building 
Masonry single-family house 
Critical Facility 
Hospital 
School 
Factory 
Industrial 
Heavy industrial building 
Light industrial building 
Office building 
 
The seismic hazard environment is modeled by locating the earthquake hypocenter close to the geographic 
center of the EPSS system, as shown in Fig. 3. This hypocenter location is not changed in this study to control the 
computational effort. The intensity of shaking at each EPSS or community component site, measured using peak 
ground motion displacement, velocity and acceleration values is computed using the ground motion attenuation 
relations proposed by Campbell and Bozorgnia (2008). The magnitude of the earthquake (M) is associated to the 
occurrence probability using the bounded Gutenberg-Richter law (the seismic hazard curve) with parameters a=4.4 
and b=1 (Kramer, 1996). 
3.1. Vulnerability analysis  
Libraries of seismic fragility functions are available for the components of the community built environment 
(Rossetto and Elnashai, 2003, Kwon and Elnashai, 2006, Jeong and Elnashai, 2007, Senel and Kayhan, 2009, 
ATC-58, 2015, OpenQuake, 2015, Syner-G, 2015) and civil infrastructure systems (HAZUS, 2015, Syner-G, 
2015) including the EPSS components. Fragility functions suitable for the built inventory (Table II) and the 
components of the EPSS generation and distribution substations (Table I), such the transformers, circuit-breakers 
and busses, are selected from these documents. The VFs are obtained as described in Section 2.1. For simplicity 
but with loss of generality, only DS1 and DS3 are considered for the EPSS components with the exception of the 
generators. Three damage states were used to describe the earthquake damage to the built inventory components 
and to evaluate the resulting electric power demand as described in Section 2.1. The power demand of schools and 
hospitals in DS1 and DS2 was kept at the pre-disaster level regardless of the incurred damage to reflect their role 
as emergent shelters. 
3.2. Parameters of the power demand Recovery Functions 
Power demand stems from the community requirements, i.e. from the electric power needed to support the 
functions of the components of the community built inventory (Table II). Therefore, the power demand depends 
on the ability to restore the functions within the buildings, which, in turn, depends on the level of the incurred 
earthquake damage. The RFs are lognormal probability distribution functions with the parameters defined in Table 
III. Different RFs are defined for damage states DS2 and DS3. It is assumed that no recovery is needed if the 
component is in damage state DS1. Given the component damage state, the probability of its full function recovery 
at time t in the recovery process is computed using the RF appropriate to the specific building inventory. The 
resulting electric power demand is computed as outlined in Section 2.2. 
Table III. Parameters for the RFs of the community built inventory components. 
Type of Structure Damage State Mean (Days) Std. (Days) 
RC apartment building 
DS2 14 12 
DS3 210 60 
Masonry apartment 
building 
DS2 14 12 
DS3 210 60 
Masonry single-family 
house 
DS2 10 9 
DS3 150 54 
Hospital 
DS2 12 10 
DS3 150 30 
School 
DS2 25 20 
DS3 240 90 
Light industry building 
DS2 45 40 
DS3 270 180 
Heavy industry building 
DS2 45 40 
DS3 300 180 
Office building DS2 25 20 
10 
 
DS3 240 72 
 
The recovery of the residential building and hospital functions is assumed to be the fastest among all 
community built environment components. Assuming that the population is not evacuated, the focus of the 
recovery is restoring shelter. Once the people are in their homes, or temporary shelters, their demand for electricity 
will recover quickly. The recovery of multi-story apartment buildings is assumed to take more time than the 
recovery of single-family homes. The durations of the recovery of light and heavy industry is the longest but is 
also affected by a larger uncertainty, because their operation cannot fully recover, or even restart, unless the 
community population (not only EPSS) is on its way to recovery. The schools and high-rise buildings can recover 
moderately fast, compared to the other built environment components mentioned above. The recovered power 
demand D(t) at the EPSS-Community system level is tracked by integrating the recovered demand of every 
component of the community built inventory as described in Section 2.2.  
3.3. Parameters of ABM agents 
The parameters of the ABM Operator and Administrator agents are defined as random variables with probability 
distributions shown in Table IV. The velocity of the Operator agent repair crew vehicle Vi is scaled down by the 
length scale factor to match the size of the scaled-down EPSS-Community system (Fig. 3), and it also accounts 
for the damage to the road network that may hamper the repair efforts. The initial repair efficiency Ei quantifies 
the initial recovery efficiency of the generation substations. To simplify the simulations, the recovery of the 
distribution substations was modeled in parallel by assuming that all of them will fully restore their functionalities 
at a specific period of time, the Recovery Threshold, after the earthquake event because of their proximity to the 
inhabited areas and the availability of additional repair crews. The Recovery Threshold for distribution substations 
is defined by a uniform distribution with limits set as a function of the earthquake magnitude (Table IV).  
Table IV. Probability distributions of the Operator and Administrator agent parameter values. 
Parameter 
Distribution 
Type 
Lower Limit Upper Limit 
Operator 
Vi (km/h) Uniform 6 8 
Ei (1/day) Uniform 20% 30% 
Recovery 
Threshold (day) 
Uniform M-2 M+4 
To,i Uniform 0.4 0.5 
Administrator 
Ta,i Uniform 0.3 0.4 
* M is the seismic magnitude obtained from the hazard curve. 
3.4. Monte Carlo simulation of the recovery of the EPSS-Community system 
The uncertainties related to the earthquake scenarios, the EPSS and the community component damage states, the 
disaster preparedness of the EPSS operator and the community, and the interaction between the recovery 
governance structures are represented by probability distributions and propagated via Monte Carlo simulations of 
individual earthquake damage recovery scenario realizations.  
Each simulation starts by assuming an earthquake of a certain magnitude M occurred with the hypocenter 
located as shown in Fig. 3. The probability of occurrence of this earthquake is obtained from the seismic hazard 
curve. The ground motion intensities are computed using the Campbell and Bozorgnia (2008) attenuation relations 
for the rock site. The VFs (Section 3.1) are used to establish the state of the EPSS-Community system at the 
beginning of the recovery phase. This state description comprises of the damage state of each EPSS and community 
component. Before the recovery time t counter is initiated, the SCDS of the EPSS Operator is selected (Table V) 
and the attributes of the Operator and the Administrator agents Vi, Ei, To,i and Ta,i are randomly generated from the 
distributions as detailed in Section 3.3. The Operator’s initial tenacity To,i is always larger than the Administrator’s 
initial tenacity Ta,i allowing the Operator to plan the EPSS restoration without interference. As a result, the repair 
crew will focus on the least seriously damaged substation, and then travels to fix the other substations following 
the ascending damage severity order. Such prioritization is justified on two grounds: 1) repairing slightly damaged 
components tends to be fast and the access to them is, most likely, not hampered by the damage to the transportation 
systems, enabling prompt restoration of electric power to some customers; and 2) heavily damaged substations 
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may need replacement rather than repair, which requires additional planning, design, financing, equipment 
acquisition, and transport.  
The damage severity Sn of a damaged generation substation n is quantified as the functionality loss 
normalized by the original functionality level, i.e.: 
 
Sn = 100*(1-Fd, n/Fo, n)                                                                    (10) 
 
where Fo,n and Fd,n are the levels of functionality (the power generation capacity) before and after the 
earthquake, respectively. The repair time rn for each generation substation n is: 
 
rn = Sn/Ei                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             (11) 
 
Given the repair priority order, the travel time tn between the damaged substations n-1 and n for n  [2, N], 
can be calculated based on the road distance Dn between substation n-1 and n as tn = Dn/Vi. For any damaged 
substation n in the repair list, the traveling time to it and the time to repair it is: 
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where t0 is the emergency action and restoration planning period right after the earthquake (set to equal 36 
hours in this study) and d0 is the distance between the repair center and the first-generation substation to be restored. 
The attributes Vi and Ei in Eq. (8) are updated if the state of the Operator is updated after the recovery performance 
check at the Resilience Check Time as described in Section 2.4. Specifically, the Tenacity parameter Ta,i of the 
Administrator agent is incremented by 0.1, i.e. Ta = Ta, i + 0.1, at the Resilience Check Time, and compared to the 
Tenacity parameter To,i of the Operator agent. The magnitude of the increment value is selected considering the 
values of the Tenacity Parameter distribution bounds in Table IV. If the community concerns prevail Ta  To,i the 
EPSS component repair priority list is reversed (i.e. the most damaged substation will be repair first), and the 
Velocity and the Efficiency parameters of the Operator agent are increased (in this study V = 1.1*Vi and E = 2*Ei) 
to increase the rate of the recovery process.  
The seismic restoration campaign evolves though the discrete time steps tn and rn. The generation capacity G 
(t) at the level of the EPSS-Community system at time t is: 
                       
                                      ∑ 𝑓𝑜,𝑗 +  
𝑛−1
𝑗=1 𝑓𝑑,𝑛 + 
𝑡−𝑡𝑛
𝑟𝑛−𝑡𝑛
× (𝑓𝑜,𝑛 − 𝑓𝑑,𝑛 )                                             tn ≤ t < rn 
 
         G(t)   =                                                                                                                                                              (13) 
 
                                      ∑ 𝑓𝑜,𝑗 +  𝑛−1𝑗=1 𝑓𝑑,𝑛                                                                                        rn-1 ≤ t < tn 
 
During time step tn, power supply capacity G(t) remains unchanged while the repair crew is travelling because no 
substation is under repair. Once the repair crew arrives at the generation substation n and starts the repair process, 
its functionality follows a linear recovery with slope equal to Eini, if tn ≤ t < rn and Ta < To, ini, or with slope equal 
to E, if tn ≤ t < rn and Ta ≥ To, ini.  
The transmission lines are considered to remain undamaged in this model. The distribution substations are 
considered to be fully functional after the Recovery Threshold time (Table IV). Therefore, the power demand at 
the level of the EPSS-Community system D(t) is computed as stated in Section 3.2.  
3.5. Seismic Contingency Dispatch Strategy  
In this case study, five different SCDSs listed in Table V are proposed. Strategy 1 prioritizes the supply to 
communities which have the largest post-earthquake demand. This strategy reflects the EPSS operator preference 
to supply first their largest users during the restoration process. Such strategy assumes that electric power can be 
produced in sufficient quantities.  
 
 
12 
 
Table V. Prioritization Strategies for Seismic Contingency Dispatch (SDCSs) 
Strategy Criterion 
1 Maximum demand 
2 Minimum demand 
3 Largest Population 
4 
Maximum normalized 
demand 
5 
Minimum normalized 
demand 
 
On the other hand, distribution substations with small power demand might be prioritized because the ability 
to generate electric power may be limited after an earthquake (SCDS 2). Similarly, SCDSs 4 and 5 prioritize 
distribution substations according to the maximum and minimum power demand normalized by the pre-earthquake 
demand, respectively. Finally, Strategy 3 prioritizes distribution substations serving large populations. 
In order to supply the communities following the priority list established by the SCDS, the distribution 
substation nodes are ranked in the descending order according to the prioritization criterion, e.g. the instantaneous 
power demand for SCDS 1. The capability of the EPSS to transmit power to distribution substation k=1, 2,…, 19 
after the disruption, is assessed by evaluating the shortest paths between a distribution substation k and any 
generation substation l=1, 2,…, 15. In order to allocate the available transferable power, the demand of the 
distribution substation is assigned to the closest generation substation following the dispatch priority ranking. The 
power allocation terminates if the total demand of the distribution substations is satisfied, or if the EPSS generation 
capacity is reached. In the latter case, distribution substation k cannot be supplied and is affected by an electric 
power deficit PD(t)k. The power allocation procedure and the available transferable power are updated during the 
recovery process based on the updated status of supply and demand side EPSS and community components.  
4. RESULTS OF THE VIRTUAL EPSS-COMMUNITY SYSTEM RESILIENCE 
ASSESSMENT 
The recovery of the virtual EPSS-Community system is simulated using the Monte Carlo simulation technique. 
Two case studies are investigated. In Section 4.1, the Operator agent guides system recovery and its repair priorities 
are always enforced. The influence of the five SCDSs on the EPSS-Community system resilience is assessed in 
Section 4.2. In Section 4.3, the Administrator agent is introduced and its influence on the recovery path is assessed 
by the comparison with the results of Section 4.1. This comparison is done only for SCDS 1. Each case study 
involves 2000 earthquake events where damage is induced and the resulting recovery paths are tracked in time 
until pre-earthquake conditions are restored. The results of these 2000 MC simulations are then statistically 
aggregated.  
4.1. Operator Agent Recovery Process 
Fig. 4 shows the medians of the electric power generation capacity, the delivered electric power, the electric power 
demand and the electric power deficit in a scenario with an earthquakes of magnitude M=7.5 and SCDS 1. 
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Fig. 4. Evolution of the generation capacity (G(t)), deliverable power (DP(t)), and power demand (D(t)) in 
the EPSS-Community system for a Magnitude 7.5 earthquake scenario and SCDS 1 (median values). 
 
Before the event, the EPSS supplies 900 MW of the electric power and covers the 733 MW of community 
demand. Immediately after the event, the median electric power demand drops to 660 MW and the median power 
generation capacity drops to 569 MW. Further, the median deliverable power drops to 524 WM due to low-voltage 
power transformer failures and high-voltage power transmission line capacity insufficiencies. After the recovery 
starts, it takes 25 days to restore the median EPSS generation capacity to the pre-earthquake level, whereas it takes 
165 days for the community demand to recover.  
The evolution of the PPwoP EPSS-Community system resilience measure is plotted in Fig. 5 for the M=7.5 
earthquake scenario and SCDS 1. Immediately after the strong earthquake, 34% of the community population is 
likely to be without electric power, as indicated by the median PPwoP. The median duration to complete recovery, 
i.e. the time required for all people in the community that can use electric power to receive it, is 11 days. The 20% 
and 80% quantile curves in Fig. 5 indicate the uncertainty associated with the seismic recovery of the EPPS-
Community systems, and show that the median PPwoP is symmetric with respect to the quantiles. 
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Fig. 5. Evolution of PPwoP for a magnitude 7.5 earthquake scenario and SCDS 1. 
 
The influence of the earthquake magnitude on the EPSS-Community system resilience is assessed in Fig. 6, 
which shows the PPwoP for M=6, 6.5, 7 and 7.5 earthquake scenarios with SCDS 1.  
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Fig. 6. The evolution of the median PPwoP for different earthquake magnitude scenarios for SCDS 1 
(median values).  
 
The resilience of the EPSS-Community system is significantly affected by the earthquake magnitude. The 
post-earthquake median PPwoP values are 34%, 29%, 24% and 11% for magnitudes 7.5, 7, 6.5 and 6, respectively. 
The median duration to complete recovery is 7, 9, 10 and 11 days for the four seismic scenarios, respectively. Fig. 
6 reveals a remarkable gap between the consequences of M=6 earthquake and the three stronger earthquakes, 
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indicating that robustness, i.e. ability to reduce the initial damage, is effective in increasing the resilience of the 
EPSS-Community system, but only up to the seismic hazard level to which the system components were designed 
for. Designing for stronger earthquakes is initially costly: such investment should be compared to the probable 
loss estimates and a cost-benefit analysis could be used to make a rational decision about an appropriate seismic 
design hazard level.  
Fig. 6 shows that the electric power restoration process can be roughly divided into three stages after the 
EPSS repair starts (36 hours after the earthquake in this study). Specifically, in the first stage (between 36 and 72 
hours after the earthquake) the PPwoP decreases quickly although the EPSS restoration strategy targets the least 
seriously damaged stations first. The explanation can be found if the demand-side is taken into account: the 
recovery probability for all the component of the built environment is rather small before the third day (see Table 
II) and therefore the gap between the deliverable and the demanded power can narrow relatively fast. In the second 
recovery stage between day 3 and day 5 (or day 6 for the M=6 earthquake scenario), the PPwoP keeps decreasing, 
but at a smaller rate, because buildings are restored and the power demand increases. In the third stage after day 5 
(or day 6 for the M=6 earthquake scenario), the generation capacity is restored quickly because the repair crew 
focuses on more severely damaged generation substations, and the PPwoP decreases at a faster rate again. 
4.2. Impact of the Seismic Contingency Dispatch Strategies (SCDSs) 
The resilience of different community sectors, the Population and the Factory sectors specified in Table I, is 
affected by the SCDS implemented by the EPSS operator. In order to quantitatively examine this influence, the 
seismic resilience of EPSS-Community system is evaluated for the two sectors separately for the five SCDSs listed 
in Table V. 
The main function of the Population sector is to support the basic livelihood of community dwellers. Its 
seismic resilience is measured by the PPwoP resilience measure defined in Section 2.3. The evolution the PPwoP 
median during the recovery process in the M=7.5 earthquake scenario is presented in Fig. 7 for the five SCDSs. 
The five curves in Fig. 7 form two clusters. The first cluster results from SCDSs 1 and 4, which prioritize the 
power supply to communities having large demand and large normalized demand. They result in PPwoP of 34% 
and 38% immediately after the earthquake, respectively. It takes 11 days to fully restore the power to the 
Population sector under these two strategies. Conversely, SCDSs 2, 3 and 5 lead to much smaller PPwoP (less 
than 20%) immediately after the earthquake, and a faster recovery of the Population sector. Therefore, the seismic 
resilience of the Population sector is improving significantly faster if SCDSs 2, 3 (and to some extent 5) are 
employed by the EPSS operator. 
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Fig. 7. Evolution of the Population sector recovery for the M=7.5 earthquake scenario and the five SCDSs 
(median values).  
 
On the other hand, the choice of the SCDSs has an opposite effect on the recovery of the Factory sector. This 
recovery process is tracked using the evolution of the power deficit of the Factory sector, PDf(t) defined in Eq. 
(7), shown in Fig. 8, for the five SCDSs. In particular, the Factory sector power deficit after the earthquake is 19 
MW for SCDS 1 and 22 MW for SCDS 4. The SCDSs 2, 3 and 5 result in over 75 MW power deficit of the Factory 
sector. Furthermore, using SCDS 1 fully satisfies the demand of the Factory sector in just 5 days, compared to 
between 9 and 10 needed when using other strategies. 
Of the five consider strategies, SCDS 5 offers a balance between relatively high resilience and speedy 
recovery of the Population sector and somewhat shorter recovery of the Factory sector. This result can be 
explained in terms of the interplay among the earthquake scenario, the topology of EPSS-Community system, and 
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the recovery pattern of different community sectors. First, the distribution stations with large power demand, e.g. 
node 34 in Table I, which is a purely Factory sector distribution node, and nodes 13, 15 and 16, which are mixed, 
will be prioritized in SCDS 1 and SCDS 4. Distribution node 34 is much farther away from the epicenter compared 
to distribution nodes 13, 15 or 16, making the expected damage to node 34 much smaller. Therefore, it is likely to 
recover significantly faster.  
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Fig. 8. Evolution of the Factory sector recovery for the M=7.5 earthquake scenario and the five SCDSs 
(median values).  
4.3. Operator and Administrator Agent Recovery Process 
The effects of the interaction between the Operator and the Administrator agents on the recovery of the EPSS-
Community system are examined by re-running the magnitude M=7.5 earthquake SCDS 1 scenario simulations 
with both agents. As explained in Sections 2.4 and 3.4, a check of the rate of EPSS-Community system recovery 
is performed at the Resilience Check Time set to be 72 hours after the earthquake in this study. Then, the value of 
the PPwoP EPSS-Community system resilience measure is compared to a threshold. Three threshold values, 10%, 
20% and 30%, are used in this study. If the PPwoP exceeds the threshold at the Resilience Check Time, the Tenacity 
Parameter of the Administrator agent is incremented and compared to the Tenacity Parameter value of the Operator 
agent, as outlined in Section 3.4. In the conducted simulations, the probabilities that the recovery plan of the 
Operator agent is changed were 46.8%, 38.6% and 26.0% for the 10%, 20% and 30% PPwoP threshold, 
respectively. For comparison, the case without activation threshold, i.e. no Administrator agent, is also reported. 
Fig. 9 shows that the involvement of the Administrator agent increases the rate of power generation recovery 
and shortens the recovery process. In the case of a strict PPwoP threshold equal to 10%, the change of repair 
priorities induced by the Administrator agent resulted in complete recovery after 19 days as compared to 25 days 
that it takes without the Administrator agent. The effects of the Administrator agent on the recovered generation 
capacity decrease for larger PPwoP threshold, and the recovery path approaches the case without interaction as 
the Administrator becomes “weaker”.  
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Fig. 9. Evolution of the electric power generation recovery for the M=7.5 earthquake SCDS 1 scenario 
(median values).  
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The effect of the Administrator agent is also evident in the rates of decrease of PPwoP during the recovery 
process, as shown in Fig. 10 for the M=7.5 earthquake SCDS 1 scenario. The change in the recovery rate does not 
occur immediately at the Recovery Check Time (3 days in this study), but somewhat later, on day 5. This change 
then results in shortening of the time to full recovery from 11 to 10 days, given the presence of the coordination 
of Administrator agent. Furthermore, like the power generation capacity demonstrated in Fig. 9, PPwoP was also 
found to decrease quicker when the Administrator became “stricter”. 
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Fig. 10. Evolution of the PPwoP EPSS-Community resilience measure for the M=7.5 earthquake SCDS 1 
scenario (median values).  
4.4. Sensitivity analysis 
The results of Section 4.1 and 4.3 show that the resilience behavior of the EPSS-Community system is heavily 
influenced by the magnitude of the earthquake scenario and by the resilience measure threshold of the 
Administrator agent. Thus, the sensitivity analysis is focused on these two parameters. To investigate the 
sensitivity of the systemic response to those parameters, the behavior of the system under different set of magnitude 
and threshold parameters is examined. Without loss of generality, the normalized systemic functionality loss Floss 
twenty days (Equation 9) and the PPwoP (defined in Section 2.3) ten days after the earthquake event, respectively, 
are presented in Fig. 11 for the earthquake M=7.5 SCDS 1 scenario. 
Both measures are equal to zero (or very close to zero), if the magnitude is lower than or equal to 6.25. 
Therefore, they show no sensitivity to the Administrator agent threshold parameter in case of low-magnitude 
earthquake scenarios. However, for scenarios with earthquake magnitudes larger than 6.25, the functionality loss 
and PPwoP increase significantly, indicating that the impact of the threshold parameter is more pronounced. The 
functionality loss is zero and the PPwoP is about 3% when the PPwoP Administrator agent threshold is equal to 
10%, even though the magnitude of the seismic scenario is 7.5 (this is also shown in Fig. 9). However, the resilience 
of the system decreases as the Administrator agent becomes less strict. For the PPwoP threshold value of 70%, 
the functionality loss reaches 8% and the PPwoP reaches 12%, and remains virtually constant for threshold values 
higher than 70%. 
 
 
     
(a) Floss                                                                                                                                        (b) PPwoP 
Fig. 11. Resilience behavior in terms of the median normalized functionality loss Floss twenty days (left 
panel) and the median PPwoP ten days (right panel) after the earthquake event for the EPSS-Community 
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system in earthquake scenarios with different magnitudes and Administrator agent PPwoP threshold 
values. 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS AND OUTLOOK 
In this paper, an agent-based framework developed to quantify the seismic resilience of an Electric Power Supply 
System (EPSS) and the community it serves was presented. In this framework, the loss and the restoration of the 
EPSS electric power supply capacity and the electric power demand from the served community are used to assess 
the instantaneous electric power deficit at any point in time during the damage absorption and recovery process. 
Therefore, such framework enables the investigation on the risk exposure and resilience of a Community-EPSS 
system.  
In this framework, damage to the components of the EPSS and of the community built environment is 
evaluated using the seismic fragility functions. The restoration of the community electric power demand is 
evaluated using the seismic recovery functions. The novelty presented in this paper is in the use of an agent-based 
approach to model the post-earthquake EPSS power supply recovery, namely the recovery of the generation and 
delivery capacity of the system. Namely, two agents, the EPSS Operator and the Community Administrator, are 
used to represent the recovery priorities, planning and actions of the EPSS operators and the community as they 
strive to recover from a disaster. The agent-based framework enables nuanced modeling of the recovery process, 
emphasizes the need to consider the supply and the demand occurring in the EPSS-Community system to 
understand the recovery process, and highlights the effects of EPSS system repair and electric power dispatch 
strategies and community demand recovery on the resilience of different sectors of the community and the 
community as a whole. Remarkably, the agent-based model reveals the emergence of possibly conflicting interests 
of the community and the EPSS operator. Furthermore, it is demonstrated that resolution of such conflicts would 
profoundly influence the recovery process of the EPSS-Community system. The communities could enforce post-
earthquake recovery performance objectives by intervening, if the recovery is slow, through changing the recovery 
priorities of the CI operators, and thus actively reducing the community risk exposure (e.g. reduce the risk of a 
long-lasting power outage that affects a significant number of people).  
In particular, the proposed agent-based seismic resilience quantification framework provides the following 
answers to the questions posed in the introductory section of this paper. The EPSS-system-related electric power 
deficit and the community-related resilience metrics are computable and can be tracked during the damage 
absorption and recovery processes to indicate the resilience (or lack thereof) of the EPSS-Community system. 
Clearly, the larger the earthquake hazard, the more challenged the EPSS-Community system will be. However, 
increasing the robustness to reduce the vulnerability of the EPSS and Community components, as well as 
increasing the rate of their repair results in an EPSS-Community system that has a smaller risk exposure and 
recovers faster. Remarkably, the rate of electric power demand recovery is at least as important for the EPSS-
Community system resilience as the rate of electric power supply recovery. The community can monitor the rate 
of the EPSS-Community recovery process using the proposed resilience measures and intervene effectively early 
on in the recovery process to change its rate or priorities. The presented sensitivity analysis shows that the 
resilience of the system could be significantly improved if the Administrator agent steps in to emphasize the 
community priorities and demand speedier and more efficient repairs. This is particularly true when it comes to 
strong earthquakes. 
The conducted simulations also reveal the remarkable role contingency electric power dispatch strategies 
have on the resilience of different community sectors. This points to the need to plan a dynamic post-disaster 
interaction between the community and the civil infrastructure system operators and develop contingency service 
dispatch strategies as well as consistent contingency demand regulation measures to shape the recovery process 
and maximize community resilience. The proposed agent-based seismic resilience quantification framework can 
be used to model and test such strategies and measures and, thus, contribute to improving community risk 
governance.  
Finally, the results of the computational experiments point to promising avenues for improving the resilience-
quantification framework. First, it can be enriched by modeling and monitoring a larger array of resilience metrics, 
some specific to community sectors and infrastructure systems components, others aggregated at the system level. 
Second, it can be generalized to model more complex repair planning and execution strategies (e.g. multiple repair 
crews), as well as to include the influence of other community infrastructure systems (e.g. transportation and 
communication) in the recovery modeling and simulation. Third, it can be expanded to include agent-based models 
of how disasters affect the population, such as casualties, evacuations and permanent or temporary relocations. 
Fourth, it can be made more sophisticated by refining the behavior of agents and modeling the interactions between 
them based on the instantaneous values of the monitored resilience metrics. Such a model could, with reasonable 
expectations, be calibrated against the damage absorption and recovery data collected after the past earthquake 
disasters. 
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